



PLESSY, BROWN, AND GRUTTER: A PLAY IN THREE 
ACTS 
Jack M. Balkin* 
Fifty-eight years separate the 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson1 
from Brown v. Board of Education.2  Forty-nine years separate the 1954 
opinion in Brown I from Grutter v. Bollinger.3  Brown, it turns out, lies 
almost exactly between Plessy and Grutter.  This is not an accident.  It 
symbolizes an important fact, which is the subject of this essay. 
People often think of Brown as a great transformation in the law, or 
even a revolution.  In fact, Brown is actually a halfway point between an 
older conception about how the Constitution secures equal citizenship 
and a newer one. Citizenship is a very large topic, and in this essay I 
will focus on only one aspect, the question of constitutional citizenship.  
I am interested in how the United States Constitution imagines what 
rights and privileges all citizens enjoy by virtue of being citizens.  To 
put it another way, if all citizens are equal before the law, in what 
respects does the Constitution demand that they be equal or be made 
equal, and in what respects can they (or must they) remain unequal even 
though they are all equally citizens?4 
Brown sits midway between two conceptions of constitutional 
citizenship.  The first conception arose with the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  It attempted to rationalize the new status of 
blacks in American society.  The first sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment bestowed citizenship on the black population that had been 
born in the United States and had been enslaved for hundreds of years.  
The key question was what this grant of citizenship meant.  The first 
conception of constitutional citizenship divided the rights of citizens 
 
 *  Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School.  This 
essay grows out of the Uri and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture delivered at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law on April 27, 2004.  My thanks to Sanford Levinson and Reva Siegel for 
their comments on a previous draft. 
 1 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 4 Thus, in this essay I shall not be concerned with the large and important set of questions 
about how the government should treat those persons within its jurisdiction who are not citizens, 
or with the constitutional powers of Congress to bestow or refuse to bestow citizenship.  I am 
interested, rather, in what a person gets (and does not get) once it is acknowledged that he or she 
is a citizen. 
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into three parts—civil, political and social—and held that equal 
citizenship meant equality of civil rights.  Hence I call it the tripartite 
theory of citizenship.  The tripartite theory was never a fully coherent 
theory; rather it was a set of categories, a language for talking and 
thinking about citizenship.  Over time, its details and its applications 
were debated, elaborated, and modified.  Eventually the whole theory 
fell apart. 
The second conception arises with the New Deal and the Second 
World War, but the details are only worked out in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, in the Civil Rights Revolution and the reaction to that 
revolution that begins with the 1968 election.  This is the model of 
constitutional citizenship we are living with now, and the one that 
constitutional law professors teach their students, whether or not they 
understand it in precisely those terms.  It is the model of scrutiny rules, 
and it views the rights of citizenship as a series of protections from state 
power that are, in turn, divided into fundamental rights and suspect 
classifications.  Like the tripartite model, this model has never been a 
fully coherent theory, but rather a language for talking and thinking 
about constitutional citizenship.  It too has been debated, elaborated and 
modified over time, and it is interesting to speculate about whether, 
after some fifty or so years of intellectual dominance, it too is slowly 
coming apart at the seams. 
Brown v. Board of Education is decided after World War II, when 
the old model has dissolved, but before a new model of constitutional 
citizenship had fully emerged to replace it.  That is one reason—
although certainly not the only one—why Brown says so little about its 
theoretical justifications for jettisoning Plessy.  Quite apart from the 
need to maintain unanimity, the details of the new theory simply had not 
been worked out.  That required the efforts in succeeding decades by 
lawyers, judges, politicians, legal scholars, and members of social 
movements.  Later on, people attributed elements of the theory of 
citizenship that developed in the 1960s and 1970s to Brown.  In 
hindsight, Brown has come to represent this second theory of 
citizenship, even though that theory was not yet articulated in 1954 and 
would not be fully articulated for several decades. 
Hence the three cases, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter, represent the 
three acts of a play, a constitutional drama about the transformation of 
one idea of constitutional citizenship into another.  Plessy, the first act, 
is decided in the full flower of the tripartite theory, indeed, just as that 
theory is beginning to unravel, although nobody realizes it yet.  Brown, 
the second act, occurs after it has passed away, but nothing has clearly 
emerged to replace it.  And the third act, Grutter, occurs at the height of 
the second conception, which has become so complicated and confusing 
that it too, may be headed for a long period of decline, producing yet 
 
2005] A PLAY IN THREE ACTS  103 
another conception of constitutional citizenship whose contours we can 
only begin to imagine. 
The historical theme of this essay is the rise and fall of different 
conceptions of constitutional citizenship and constitutional equality.  
The jurisprudential theme is that constitutional principles are political 
compromises.  That may seem paradoxical, because we normally 
oppose principle to compromise; people who compromise betray 
principle, and people who stick to their principles do not compromise.  
Yet adopting certain constitutional principles, and not others, is 
sometimes a method of compromise; it is a way of explaining and 
justifying political compromise in what appears to be a principled 
fashion.  The story of Plessy, Brown, and Grutter is a perfect example 
of how principles of equal citizenship were adopted at particular 
moments in the country’s history to effect particular compromises that 
would be palatable to the most powerful groups in society, in this case, 
white Americans. 
Here is the basic idea: all equality law is also the law of inequality.  
The law marks a liminal point.  It declares what constitutes unequal 
treatment as a matter of law.  At the same time, it also states what is not 
unequal treatment, or, put slightly differently, what forms and claims of 
inequality the law will not recognize as presenting real or remediable 
problems of inequality.  The law only sees some forms of inequality and 
not others because that is how law is made.  First, law is simply 
imperfect.  Second, and more important, law is a compromise of 
contending forces and interests in society.  Legal doctrines that enforce 
ideas of equality enforce the nature of that compromise and restate it in 
principled terms.  Thus, what law enforces is not equality, but equality 
in the eyes of the law. 
Law does not stand outside the forms of social stratification that 
exist in any society.  Rather, to some extent, it also supports them and 
legitimates them.  That does not mean that law cannot do enormous 
good in reforming discredited social practices.  The point is rather that 
even (and especially) when law participates in social change, law is 
complicit in the new forms of social stratification that replace older, 
discredited forms.  As law recognizes and outlaws some forms of 
inequality, it fails to recognize or legitimates others.  My colleague 
Reva Siegel has given a name to this process; she calls it “preservation-
through-transformation.”5  For example, the antebellum system of 
 
 5 See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” 
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 83 (2000); Reva 
B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, 
in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 
1998); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal 
Protection No Longer Protects]; Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife-Beating as 
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chattel slavery was overthrown and replaced by a new system that, by 
the late nineteenth century, had produced the system of de jure 
segregation known as Jim Crow.  This transformation surely promoted 
equality, but it also left behind a “remainder”—not simply the dregs of 
older discredited forms but also new forms of social stratification that 
law rationalizes and protects.  Legal transformations, and the political 
compromises they generate, often leave behind such a remainder, as 
powerful groups press for legal norms and principles that suit their 
evolving identities and interests. 
Characterizing law’s role in maintaining inequality while 
guaranteeing new forms of equality is always controversial.  At the 
height of the Jim Crow regime, some people believed that Jim Crow 
preserved inequality to which the law turned a blind eye, others thought 
that the system of segregation was unjust but that there was little that 
could be done about it for practical reasons, and still others believed that 
Jim Crow was fully consistent with equality and that to eliminate it 
would interfere with people’s rights and liberties.  Our own era is not so 
different from theirs: whether social stratification exists, whether it is 
unjust, and whether law is helping to maintain it are controversial 
questions. 
Viewed from this perspective, the law only protects equality to a 
certain degree, while simultaneously maintaining and fostering other 
features of inequality in new forms and guises.  From the law’s 
standpoint, however, that remainder of inequality is wholly consistent 
with legal equality.  From the law’s standpoint, all citizens are equal 
before the law. 
Just as the law of equality is also the law of inequality, the law of 
equal citizenship is also law of unequal citizenship (or non-citizenship).  
Conceptions of citizenship mark what all citizens enjoy by virtue of 
being citizens.  But they also simultaneously mark out what forms of 
inequality may exist between citizens, and what forms of social 
hierarchy or stratification may exist wholly consistent with all citizens 
being equal before the law.6  Conceptions of citizenship mark what 
counts as equality, what counts as inequality, and what is not even 
recognized as raising a question of equality or inequality.  Doctrinal 
forms arise to articulate, explain, and justify this conception of equal 
citizenship.  At the same time, these doctrinal forms articulate, explain, 
and justify what is not contained in the conception of equal citizenship, 
and thus, what remainder of inequality the law does not recognize as 
legal inequality, and what forms of inequality may persist even as all 
citizens are judged equal before the law. 
 
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2175-88 (1996). 
 6 At the same time, they also mark the forms of inequality and social stratification that may 
exist between citizens and non-citizens. 
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We can see the three acts of our play in this light: What we are 
interested in is how people theorized the notion of what it meant to be 
equal before the law, and how certain conceptions of citizenship, 
articulated through constitutional doctrine, emerged in order to 
simultaneously extend equality and withhold it.  The tripartite model is 
a method of promoting and withholding equality, of recognizing 
inequality and failing to recognize it.  But so too, is our current model 
of scrutiny rules.  And so too, one suspects, will be whatever replaces 
that model in the future.  This perspective is not at all inconsistent with 
an idea of progress in human affairs.  After all, few today believe that 
the current model of equality law is not an improvement on Jim Crow, 
just as few today believe that, however vicious the system of Jim Crow 
segregation was, it was not a distinct improvement over the evils of 
chattel slavery.  Just as we can see Jim Crow as both an improvement 
over a previous form of social life and the creation of a new form of 
social structuration supported and fortified through law, we can come to 
understand how our own model of equality—the model of scrutiny 
rules—is not the final achievement of true equality, but rather has 
accompanied new forms of social structure that now help maintain new 
forms of social hierarchy.7 
 
ACT I:     PLESSY AND THE TRIPARTITE MODEL 
 
Along with astounding practical difficulties, the Civil War also left 
behind an enormous theoretical problem.  The Thirteenth Amendment 
abolished slavery, making all members of the American political 
community free.  But did this make all of them citizens, and if they 
were citizens, what rights did they have by virtue of being citizens? 
The Fourteenth Amendment tried to provide an answer.  Its first 
sentence, the Citizenship Clause, stated that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”8  
Blacks, whom the Dred Scott decision had held were not and could 
never be citizens,9 were established as full citizens and members of the 
American political community.10  Out of the debates over the 
 
 7 See Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 5, at 1113 (“If we 
reconstruct the grounds on which our predecessors justified subordinating practices of the past, 
we may be in a better position to evaluate contested practices in the present.”). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 9 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406-11 (1856). 
 10 Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Amendment left some persons out of the political community.  
See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (holding that Native Americans born in the United States 
are not automatically citizens).  Congress did not pass legislation naturalizing all “Indians born 
within the territorial limits of the United States” until 1924.  See 8 U.S.C. § 140(a)(s) (2000).  
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Reconstruction Amendments came a language for understanding what 
citizenship was and what it entailed.  This set of assumptions I call the 
tripartite theory of citizenship. 
The tripartite theory divided rights (and equality) into three 
different categories: civil, political, and social.11  What fell into each 
category was always somewhat contested,12 but for the most part civil 
equality meant equal rights to make contracts, own, lease, and convey 
property,  sue and be sued, and, according to some formulas, the rights 
of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.  All adult members 
of the political community possessed civil equality; this is what black 
males obtained when they became free.  Unmarried adult women also 
possessed civil equality with men, although in practice women lost 
almost all of their civil rights upon marriage because of the coverture 
rules, which were premised on the legal fiction that a wife surrendered 
her rights to her husband. 
Civil equality, which meant equal civil rights, was distinguished 
from political equality, which meant equal political rights.  Political 
rights included the right to vote, serve on juries, and hold office.  Not all 
citizens had these rights, so people could be civilly equal but not 
politically equal.  Black men and unmarried women were civilly equal 
to white men but not politically equal.  The distinction between civil 
and political equality was important to the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because many of them did not want blacks to have the right 
to vote, to say nothing of women.  That is why a separate Fifteenth 
Amendment, guaranteeing black suffrage, was thought necessary. 
The idea of social equality was more amorphous.  Essentially it 
concerned whether persons were considered social equals in civil 
society.  Social equals are those with equal social status.  Social equality 
and social inequality were not the business of the state; rather social 
equality and social inequality were natural features of human interaction 
produced through the preferences and behavior of private individuals, 
and normally the state should not interfere with these decisions.  
However, “social equality” had another, more racially charged meaning.  
 
Moreover, making blacks birthright citizens distinguished them from Chinese immigrant laborers, 
who were not only denied the ability to become citizens but who were also excluded in the 1880s.  
See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), repealed by Chinese Exclusion 
Repeal Act of 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943).  In 1898 the Supreme Court finally held that 
children of Chinese immigrants born in the United States were birthright citizens.  United States 
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
 11 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 216-18, 
258-61, 271-74 (1998); EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 
1863-1869, at 103-06 (1990); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE 
UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 276-78, 394-402 (1982). 
 12 RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 154-56 (1999) (“The many 
political and legal actors who spoke and wrote about rights using these terms did not always 
employ the categories in the same way.”). 
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It was also a code word for miscegenation and racial intermarriage.13  
The idea (or rather the fear) was that the relative status of blacks and 
whites as a group would be altered by a preponderance of mixed race 
children, or if blacks and whites regarded themselves as members of the 
same family.  Thus, states could continue to prohibit interracial sex or 
interracial marriage consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The two ideas underlying social equality are in tension with each 
other: The first idea assumes that social equality is the product of 
natural affinities and private social interactions.  The state should not 
interfere with these interactions because they are private and an 
important aspect of individual liberty, and it would be futile for the state 
to do so in any event.14  No matter what the state does, most white 
people will continue to regard themselves as the social superiors of 
black people.15  The second idea assumes, to the contrary, that the state 
may (and perhaps should) intervene to prevent the mixing of the races, 
particularly where sex and the formation of families is concerned.  Even 
if some blacks and whites want to form intimate relations through 
private agreement, the state may stop them from doing so.  In order to 
preserve social inequality it is necessary to know who is white and who 
is black, and miscegenation threatens to blur those distinctions.  
Individual decisions—the exercise of individual liberty—will affect the 
status of other members of the social group without their consent.  
Hence the state’s intervention is not only not seen as futile, it is viewed 
as necessary to preserve racial identity and racial status.  Not 
surprisingly, after the Civil War many states passed laws and created 
categories determining racial status and indicating the degree of black 
ancestry sufficient to make a person black by law.  In Plessy itself, the 
Supreme Court noted that states had different rules, under which the 
 
 13 See Emily Field Van Tassel, “Only the Law Would Rule Between Us”: Antimiscegenation, 
the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate over Rights After the Civil War, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 873, 877, 891 (1995). 
 14 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), where the Court explained: 
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of 
natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s merits and a voluntary consent 
of individuals. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. 
Gallagher “this end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which conflict 
with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they are designed to operate. 
When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before 
the law, and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the 
end for which it was organized, and performed all of the functions respecting social 
advantages with which it is endowed.”  Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial 
instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to 
do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 15 Id.  Thus, Justice Brown argued, “if, as has been more than once the case, and is not 
unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state 
legislature,” and ordered segregation of railway carriages, this would not “relegate the white race 
to an inferior position” because “the white race . . . would not acquiesce in this assumption.”  Id. 
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same person might be judged black in one state and white in another, 
but asserted that these were matters of state law that had raised no 
constitutional problems.16  The Court did not think that defining race by 
law made any difference to the equality of blacks before the law. 
The major reason for the tripartite theory was that most of the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not want to give blacks full 
equality.  In particular, they did not want to give blacks the right to vote. 
Most of them also did not consider blacks to be full social equals with 
whites, and so they believed that states should still be able to restrict 
interracial marriage and perhaps even segregate some public facilities. 
The key idea of the tripartite theory was that blacks and whites 
were civilly equal. They had equal rights to make contracts, own, sell, 
convey, and lease property, sue and be sued, express themselves, and 
practice their religion.  To the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
this meant that blacks and whites were equal before the law.  Today this 
formulation seems strange to us.  How can blacks and whites be equal 
before the law if segregation is constitutional and if blacks have no 
constitutional right to vote?  But the idea made perfect sense to many of 
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they 
assumed that voting and social equality were not necessary elements of 
citizenship.  Some citizens, such as children, could not vote, and it was 
no business of the law to require that those who were socially unequal 
by nature be regarded as socially equal. 
In short, the basic assumption of most of the framers and ratifiers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was that all citizens were equal before 
the law even if they were not political or social equals. Equality before 
the law simply meant civil equality, nothing more.  Furthermore, some 
citizens did not enjoy full civil rights because of their status (minors) or 
because they willingly surrendered those rights (married women, whose 
rights were merged into those of their husbands under the coverture 
rules). 
The tripartite model of citizenship is an ideological and practical 
compromise.  It reflects the contending forces in American society, the 
political compromises necessary to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, 
 
 16 Justice Brown explained: 
It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to constitute a 
colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which there is a 
difference of opinion in the different States, some holding that any visible admixture of 
black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race; others, that it depends 
upon the preponderance of blood; and still others that the predominance of white blood 
must only be in the proportion of three-fourths.  But these are question[s] to be 
determined under the laws of each State and are not properly put in issue in this case.  
Under the allegations of his petition it may undoubtedly become a question of 
importance whether, under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the white or 
colored race. 
Id. at 552 (citations omitted). 
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and the play of forces in the years that followed which took the theory 
in a trajectory that could not have been fully foreseen.  The tripartite 
model acknowledges that blacks are free and equal citizens, but it 
defines equal citizenship so that blacks and women do not have the right 
to vote.  Black men gained the franchise in 1870, women in 1920, in 
each case through constitutional amendment. 
The concept of “equality before the law” simultaneously constructs 
and produces forms of equality and inequality.  It is a particularly good 
example of how the law of equality is also the law of inequality.  It is 
obvious to us today that the principles of the tripartite theory are a 
compromise that prevents blacks and women from enjoying full equal 
citizenship.  We see how these principles were a compromise because 
we approach equality from a different historical vantage point.  But we 
need to imagine how our own conception of equality is also a set of 
compromises characteristic of our own era.  Viewing our own practices 
as a model akin to the tripartite model helps us see our own practices of 
equality from the perspective of another era. The point of this historicist 
idea is that we should try to see our own theory of citizenship in this 
light. Its principles are actually an ideological compromise that arises 
out of  political compromise. 
The tripartite model of citizenship not only produced different 
results from present day constitutional doctrine.  It also reasoned about 
citizenship in importantly different ways.  A good example is the case 
of Minor v. Happersett,17 decided in 1874.  Virginia Minor, a key figure 
in the phase of the suffrage movement called the New Departure, argued 
that the Fourteenth Amendment already gave women the right to vote.18 
Today we would judge whether women had an equal right to 
something in terms of the familiar categories of suspect classifications 
and fundamental rights.  Of course, the text of the Nineteenth 
Amendment solves the problem of voting immediately, but my point is 
that under today’s doctrinal assumptions the Amendment seems to be 
superfluous—presumably courts would guarantee women equal rights 
to vote even if the text of the Nineteenth Amendment were absent.  That 
is because classifications based on sex are suspect or quasi-suspect, and 
require “an exceedingly persuasive justification;”19 the right to vote is 
 
 17 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
 18 On the New Departure, see Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists 
and the “Living Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456 (2001); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 180-83 
(2000); Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman 
Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, in ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, WOMAN 
SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 98-106 (1998); Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice 
as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1364-75 (1995). 
 19 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
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either a fundamental right or a fundamental interest, and access to the 
ballot may not be subject to invidious distinctions.20  So today we would 
say that denying women the right to vote involves a suspect 
classification that also burdens a fundamental interest.  Thus, the law is 
doubly suspect. 
But of course, the Nineteenth Amendment was not superfluous in 
1920, and indeed it is quite possible that had women not won the vote in 
1920, the Supreme Court would not have created sex equality doctrines 
some fifty years later that make the Amendment appear superfluous 
today.  Woman suffrage required a constitutional amendment because 
people operated under very different assumptions about what it meant to 
be a full and equal citizen than we do today.21 
Thus, in 1874, when the Supreme Court decided Minor v. 
Happersett, it asked very different questions than a court would ask 
today, even though both courts would be construing the very same 
amendment.  The Court began by arguing at some length that women 
are citizens, and had always been understood to be, even before the 
Fourteenth Amendment.22  Therefore women are equal before the law.  
The Court’s next question, however, was whether voting is a necessary 
attribute of citizenship, that is, whether voting rights involve civil, 
political, or social equality.23  The answer was clear: voting, like jury 
service, is not one of the privileges or immunities of citizens, the basic 
components of civil equality.24  If voting was one of the privileges and 
immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court asked, 
what was the point of ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment?25  Children 
are citizens, and they cannot vote; conversely, as the Court itself pointed 
out, in some states, non-citizens were given the right to vote if they 
expressed an intention to become citizens later on.26 
 
 20 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966). 
 21 On the theories of citizenship prevalent prior to the ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, see Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 979-87 (2002). 
 22 Minor, 88 U.S. at 167-70. 
 23 Id. at 170 (“The direct question is, therefore, presented whether all citizens are necessarily 
voters.”). 
 24 Id. at 171 (“It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of 
suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was 
adopted.”).  The Court’s argument in Minor proceeded by assuming that all citizens were entitled 
to the privileges and immunities of citizenship—an alternative formulation for the idea of civil 
equality—and then asked whether, whatever those privileges and immunities might have been 
before the Fourteenth Amendment, voting was added to them by that amendment.  It also pointed 
to section two of the Fourteenth Amendment, which stated that states would be penalized in their 
representation in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral College if they denied the 
right to vote to “to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age and 
citizens of the United States . . . .”  Id. at 174. 
 25 Id. at 175. 
 26 Id. at 177. 
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The Court did not waste much effort deciding  Minor v. 
Happersett, and in fact the State of Missouri, the defendant in the case, 
did not even bother to send opposing counsel.  Minor is an easy case 
under the tripartite theory.  It is also an easy case—with exactly the 
opposite result—under our current model of constitutional citizenship, 
even without any help from the Nineteenth Amendment.  That is proof 
enough of how radically different the two models are in their basic 
assumptions. 
I have called the tripartite theory of citizenship a theory, but it was 
never very well-worked out.  It is probably better to say that it was a 
common language and a shared set of concepts for talking and thinking 
about questions of citizenship and equality.27  Not everyone agreed 
about its concepts or their contours, and over time, the ideas in the 
theory developed and changed. 
For example, by the time Plessy was decided in 1896, the boundary 
between political and civil equality had proved increasingly difficult to 
manage, even though, of course, in most states women still lacked the 
right to vote.  In 1880, in Strauder v. West Virginia,28 the Supreme 
Court struck down a law banning blacks from serving on juries under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, while saying nothing about the Fifteenth 
Amendment, even though, as Justice Field pointed out, jury service was 
an attribute of political, not civil equality.29  In 1896, the same year as 
Plessy, in Gibson v. Mississippi,30 the Court stated that “the Constitution 
of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and 
political rights are concerned, discrimination by the general 
government, or by the states, against any citizen because of his race. All 
citizens are equal before the law.”31  A similar idea appears in Plessy 
itself: 
The object of the [Fourteenth] Amendment was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in 
the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
 
 27 Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 5, at 1120 (noting that 
“distinctions among civil, political, and social rights functioned more as a framework for debate 
than a conceptual scheme of any legal precision”); PRIMUS, supra note 12, at 154-57, 169-71. 
 28 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 29 Id. at 312 (Field, J., dissenting) (dissenting “on the grounds stated in [his] opinion in Ex 
parte Virginia”); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting) (“The 
equality of the protection secured [by the Fourteenth Amendment] extends only to civil rights as 
distinguished from those which are political, or arise from the form of the government and its 
mode of administration.”).  However, perhaps Strauder protected not the political rights of the 
excluded members of the jury, but the defendant Strauder’s right to be tried only by a jury of his 
peers (or a jury fairly selected from a cross-section of the community).  The latter right would be 
an attribute of civil, and not political equality.  See AMAR, supra note 11, at 272. 
 30 162 U.S. 565 (1896). 
 31 Id. at 591. 
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from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon 
terms unsatisfactory to either.32 
The tripartite theory has become a two pronged theory.  Civil and 
political equality were guaranteed, but social equality was still different, 
because a person’s social status among his or her fellow citizens is 
formed by private interactions in a private sphere of association. 
What Plessy turns on, then, is the meaning of social equality, and 
whether segregation of the races in railway cars is a matter of civil 
equality, in which case it is unconstitutional, or social equality, in which 
case it is perfectly fine as long as it is “reasonable, and . . . enacted in 
good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the 
annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”33  Justice Brown, writing 
for the majority, says segregation of railway carriages is a question of 
social equality and therefore not unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.34  Justice Harlan, in dissent, insists that segregation is a 
denial of civil equality.35  Indeed, his argument is that integration of the 
races in public facilities has nothing whatsoever to do with the social 
equality of whites and blacks, an argument which sounds more than a 
little disturbing from today’s standpoint: 
[S]ocial equality no more exists between two races when traveling in 
a passenger coach or a public highway than when members of the 
same races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or stand 
or sit with each other in a political assembly, or when they use in 
common the streets of a city or town, or when they are in the same 
room for the purpose of having their names placed on the registry of 
voters, or when they approach the ballot box in order to exercise the 
high privilege of voting.36 
In other words, it doesn’t matter how much you integrate the institutions 
of American political and civil society.  Blacks and whites are not social 
equals and they are not going to be. 
 
 32 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
 33 Id. at 550. 
 34 Id. at 551-52 (“If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior 
to the other civilly or politically.  If one race be inferior to the other socially, the constitution of 
the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”). 
 35 Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, 
while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil 
freedom and the equality before the law established by the constitution.  It cannot be justified 
upon any legal grounds.”). 
 36 Id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan then attempts to clinch the argument by 
comparing blacks to Chinese.  The Chinese, he explains, are “a race so different from our own 
that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States.  Persons 
belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country.”  Id.  Since “a 
Chinaman can ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United States,” the 
Louisiana statute treats blacks worse than people who are not and cannot be citizens.  Id.  On 
Harlan’s views about the Chinese, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the 
Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996). 
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Although Justices Brown and Harlan come out differently in 
Plessy, they are not fundamentally in disagreement.  Rather, they are 
fighting over the meaning of the same category—social equality.  Both 
assume that the Fourteenth Amendment does not make blacks and 
whites social equals.  Indeed, immediately before launching into his 
famous invocation of a colorblind Constitution, Harlan notes: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. 
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and 
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it 
remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of 
constitutional liberty.37 
Colorblind government is fully consistent, Harlan thinks, with the social 
inequality of the races, even the dominance of the white race “for all 
time.”  The question is whether segregation of railway carriages merely 
accommodates social inequality, as Brown and the majority believe, or 
whether it infringes on civil equality, as Harlan contends. 
Behind this disagreement is a larger agreement about the nature of 
social equality: The key idea is that social equality and inequality are 
produced in the realm of private choice, by whom people choose to 
associate with, befriend, avoid, and snub.  Social hierarchies and status 
differences are not the product of the law; rather they emerge from 
networks of private choices that, in turn, reflect what Brown calls 
“natural affinities” and “physical differences.”38  Both private contacts 
within markets and private social encounters reflect these affinities and 
preferences.  Social engineering that attempts to alter these affinities 
and preferences is futile and will only make people unhappy, but 
reasonable restrictions designed to soothe social tensions and diffuse 
social conflicts are not social engineering.  Rather, they facilitate the 
private sphere. 
Brown’s assumptions about the private sphere are hardly unique to 
the race cases.  They are part of more general assumptions about the 
relationship between public power and private choice in late nineteenth 
century.  These are the key assumptions of the substantive due process 
jurisprudence of the Lochner era, which begins only a year after Plessy, 
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana.39  Lochner-era jurisprudence is based on the 
inherent limits of the police power that underlie the social contract.  The 
state must not invade private spheres of interaction, which it exists in 
part to protect.  When the state acts to protect or promote the morals, 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens within reasonable limits, it 
facilitates the realm of private choice.  When it goes further than this, it 
invades the private sphere and acts unconstitutionally. 
 
 37 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 38 Id. at 551. 
 39 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
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Lochner-era jurisprudence is deeply connected to the basic 
assumptions of the tripartite theory of citizenship. Indeed, the two 
strands of thought flow from the same source.  When the state acts 
within its police power, it does not offend, but rather protects and 
secures, the civil rights and the civil equality of all of its citizens.  
Conversely, when the state acts unreasonably, for example, when it 
engages in “class legislation” that favors one social group over another, 
it denies civil rights and hence abridges civil equality—for example, by 
abridging the right to choose one’s profession, or the right to contract. 
Therefore, it is entirely unsurprising that Justice Brown justifies 
Louisiana’s segregation of railway carriages by invoking the state’s 
police power.  The Fourteenth Amendment, he explains, “enforce[s] the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law,” that is, their civil 
equality.  At the same time, it left open differences in social status—“in 
the nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from 
political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms 
unsatisfactory to either.”40  Laws that smooth racial tensions and 
prevent social offense are not class legislation but rather attempts to 
facilitate a well functioning private sphere of social and economic 
interaction.  Thus, Brown, argues, “[l]aws permitting, and even 
requiring, . . . separation [of the races], in places where they are liable to 
be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either 
race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized 
as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their 
police power.”  “The most common instance of this” exercise of the 
state’s police power, Brown explains, “is connected with the 
establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which 
have been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by 
courts of states where the political rights of the colored race have been 
longest and most earnestly enforced.”41 
Brown’s thesis proved too much.  The police power argument 
provided an ideological justification for an entire system of state 
regulation defining racial identity and requiring separation of everything 
from public water fountains to funeral parlors.  What Brown saw as 
merely a method of facilitating private choice was in fact directing it 
and restricting it in countless ways.  Even if blacks and whites wanted 
to use the same facilities, the states forbade it.42 
 
 40 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. 
 41 Id. 
 42 It is no accident that preserving social inequality required so much state regulation.  David 
Bernstein and Illya Somin point out that because white racial superiority is a public good among 
whites, maintaining it takes considerable government intervention.  Thus, Jim Crow laws solved 
collective action problems among racist whites (some of whom might defect in order to achieve 
individual gains).  These laws also shifted the costs of maintaining segregation from individual 
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The brute reality of vast systems of Jim Crow legislation which 
were put in place for the most part after Plessy, combined with denials 
of black political rights, put the two different notions of social rights I 
described earlier on a collision course.  If social equality and inequality 
are produced by purely private decisions about association and 
contracting, then states wrongly intrude in the private sphere when they 
require separation of the races as much as when they require integration.  
On the other hand, if the differential social status of whites and blacks 
as groups will inevitably be undermined by individual decisions to 
mingle, contract, or marry, then states have not only the right, but 
perhaps also the duty, to protect the integrity of the private sphere of 
association from free riders by keeping the races apart in certain 
situations.43  In particular, this conflict between different conceptions of 
social inequality meant that Lochner and Plessy were in conflict with 
each other, a conflict which is most apparent in Buchanan v. Warley.44  
In Buchanan the Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance that kept 
blacks from buying houses in predominantly white neighborhoods on 
the grounds that the law hampered individuals’ freedom of contract.  
The Court said: 
Colored persons are citizens of the United States and have the right 
to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without laws 
discriminating against them solely on account of color.  These 
enactments did not deal with the social rights of men, but with those 
fundamental rights in property which it was intended to secure upon 
the same terms. . .  The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes 
enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a 
colored man to acquire property without state legislation 
discriminating against him solely because of color. . . .  The case 
presented does not deal with an attempt to prohibit the amalgamation 
of the races. The right which the ordinance annulled was the civil 
right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so 
to a person of color and of a colored person to make such disposition 
to a white person.45 
Note that both Plessy and Buchanan can be seen alternatively as cases 
involving civil rights or social rights.  The Court thought that Plessy 
involved merely social rights—because blacks could still ride on 
 
whites onto the legal system, and  simultaneously minimized the costs of maintaining a system of 
white supremacy.  David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights 
Reconsidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591, 602 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 
(2004)). 
 43 Id. at 603-05. 
 44 245 U.S. 60 (1917); see also Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).  In Berea 
College, the Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky law that prohibited corporations from maintaining 
racially integrated schools. 
 45 Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 78-79, 81 (citations omitted). 
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railway carriages—while Buchanan involved civil rights because the 
right to purchase a particular piece of property was completely 
extinguished.  Yet one could argue the reverse: Harlan thought 
separation of the races in Plessy violated black civil rights.  One could 
also argue that Buchanan was really about social rights rather than a ban 
on the right to purchase property, because blacks could still purchase 
properties in other neighborhoods.46  Moreover, as in Plessy and in the 
earlier case of Pace v. Alabama,47 the limitation was formally equal—
whites and blacks were equally forbidden from selling to one another. 
Of course, no theory of constitutional citizenship is purely a matter 
of logic.  It is always in conversation with politics. And although its 
contours are shaped by political compromises, its concepts also offer 
people ways of critiquing existing political and legal arrangements.  
That is as true of the tripartite model as it is of our present day model of 
scrutiny rules. 
 
ACT II:     BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE RISE OF THE MODEL 
OF SCRUTINY RULES 
 
The intellectual edifice of the tripartite theory and the police power 
theory falls apart during the first part of the twentieth century.  It might 
look as if the police power theory goes first, during the constitutional 
struggles over the New Deal, but in fact they both collapse together.  
The reasons have less to do with the internal logic of doctrine than with 
how concepts and categories interact with social and political changes. 
By the time Brown is decided, the Supreme Court has also 
abandoned the other key feature of the theory of citizenship that we get 
from Reconstruction: the notion of inherent limits on the police power 
in order to preserve a private sphere of individual liberty.  The 
Jacksonian focus on class legislation has also disappeared, at least with 
respect to economic regulation, although it will soon reemerge in a new 
form as an prohibition against caste or invidious discrimination. 
In place of the Lochner-era notions of limited police power, the 
Supreme Court developed doctrines that legitimated and justified the 
regulatory and welfare state.  Indeed, this is the whole point of the New 
Deal.  The New Deal is a new social contract with a new concept of 
citizenship. This is the “deal” in the New Deal: give the federal 
government more power to regulate private transactions, and, in turn, 
 
 46 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 699-700 (1992). 
 47 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883) (upholding provisions of the state code that punished interracial 
cohabitation more severely than cohabitation between persons of the same race on the grounds 
that “[t]he punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the same”). 
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the government will take care of its citizens, providing public goods, 
security, and investments in human capital, including education. 
But this New Deal had an ominous flip side.  The more power the 
government assumes, the more ways it has to regulate and control the 
citizenry, and hence the greater the threat to liberty.  Hence at the very 
moment when the Supreme Court legitimates the regulatory state, it also 
begins to create a new set of doctrines that will replace the Lochner-era 
emphasis on inherent limits of federal regulatory power and state police 
power.  The replacements that eventually emerge are the doctrines of 
suspect classifications and fundamental rights. 
We already see the glimmerings of this idea in the famous 
Carolene Products footnote.48 In the midst of expounding the highly 
deferential standard that will become the rational basis test, the Court 
suggests that it may abandon the traditional presumption of 
constitutionality where the Bill of Rights is affected, where the 
democratic process is adulterated, or whether “discrete and insular 
minorities” are harmed.49  The idea is extended further in the concept of 
“preferred liberties” in the 1940s.50  In addition, from the early 
twentieth century to the mid 1960s, the Supreme Court incorporates 
most of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and applies 
them to state governments, treating these guarantees as fundamental 
liberties of all citizens.51  In this way, the Supreme Court preserves 
certain elements of the libertarian jurisprudence in the 1920s and 1930s 
and redescribes and redeploys them so that they mesh with the 
obligations of government in the regulatory and welfare state.52 
 
 48 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 49 Id.  Thus, the theory of judicial scrutiny in this second system of citizenship comes with a 
corresponding idea about democracy.  The political process is responsive to the will of the people, 
as it should be in a democracy, but sometimes the system misfires or has predictable pathologies.  
Therefore courts need to protect discrete and insular minorities from being abused by the political 
process, and they need to protect everyone’s fundamental rights.  In all other cases, the system 
should rely on democratic mobilization and the play of interest groups to protect people’s 
interests.  This conception of democracy is the successor to the combination of the police power 
theory and the tripartite theory. 
 50 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of press, freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”); see also Howard Gillman, Preferred 
Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties 
Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623 (1994).  The First Amendment was the obvious candidate for 
a preferred liberty that would receive heightened judicial scrutiny because of its connections to 
democratic self-government.  See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The 
Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 327-42 (1996) 
(tracing the history of the preferred liberty idea in the 1930s and 1940s). 
 51 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (listing incorporated clauses); Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions.”). 
 52 Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 150-56 (1991) (arguing that 
Griswold v. Connecticut synthesizes earlier commitments to liberty from the Founding Period 
with the New Deal). 
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By the 1960s and 1970s, we have a full blown system of 
fundamental rights (the successor of the idea of preferred freedoms) and 
forbidden classifications.53  Both fundamental rights and rights against 
forbidden classifications are enforced by scrutiny rules. 
I distinguish scrutiny rules from conduct rules.  Conduct rules state 
that a government agent may do this or may not do that.  For example, 
the requirement that a bill must be presented to the President for his 
signature before it becomes law is a conduct rule.  So too is the rule of 
New York Times v. Sullivan Co.54 that states may not allow libel suits 
against public officials unless the plaintiff demonstrates actual malice.55  
Many elements of constitutional doctrine are conduct rules.  But a far 
larger number of rules, and particularly the rules that concern civil 
rights and civil liberties, employ scrutiny rules.  Scrutiny rules allow 
government to do things if it gives a sufficiently good reason.  Thus 
scrutiny rules are a special form of balancing, with different weights 
attached depending on the nature of the interest at stake.  When the 
level of scrutiny is either very relaxed or very strict, the scrutiny rule 
begins to resemble a conduct rule.  However, there are enough examples 
of statutes struck down under rational basis, or upheld under strict 
scrutiny, to suggest that there still is balancing going on, even though 
the actual features of the balancing are often disguised in the various 
formulas that courts use to scrutinize government action.  It might be 
better to say that rational basis and strict scrutiny are scrutiny rules with 
particular weights that limit judicial discretion in different ways. 
One might trace the origins of scrutiny rules back to McCulloch v. 
Maryland’s famous language about review of federal power for 
pretext.56  But the real birth of scrutiny rules occurs in the Lochner 
period, and these doctrines were created to put into effect the theories of 
limited government in vogue at the time.  When faced with challenges 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, courts asked whether 
economic and social regulation had a fair relation to a legitimate 
purpose for regulation consistent with the theory of the police power, or 
 
 53 There is, however, a shift in emphasis between these two conceptions.  The idea that the 
First Amendment is a “preferred liberty” originated from the notion that First Amendment 
liberties are inextricably linked to democracy and self-government.  White, supra note 50, at 329-
30.  The rights that the Supreme Court later declared to be “fundamental” do not always have this 
connection to democratic theory. 
 54 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 55 Id. at 279-83. 
 56 In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall argued that: 
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited 
by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass 
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would 
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come 
before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land. 
Id. 
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whether, as in Lochner itself, the challenged regulation was “a labor 
law, pure and simple”57 and therefore an illegitimate attempt at taking 
from A and giving to B.58  The language of scrutiny is employed in dicta 
in Korematsu,59 appears in a few First Amendment cases, and then 
finally becomes the standard method of thinking about constitutional 
equality in McLaughlin v. Florida60 and Loving v. Virginia.61  
Ironically, but perhaps appropriately, Brown v. Board of Education does 
not use the language of scrutiny.  It is a case about harm to black 
schoolchildren, although today many people, I suspect, instinctively 
identify it with the doctrinal proposition that racial classifications are 
strongly disfavored and will be viewed by courts with the most 
searching scrutiny. 
We can summarize the two different models of constitutional 
citizenship in the following chart: 
 
 57 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
 58 See id. at 64 (“It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of 
this character, while passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of 
protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.”). 
 59 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 60 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
 61 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
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The decisions in Brown and the companion case of Bolling v. 
Sharpe62 are doctrinally awkward.  That is not entirely surprising, 
because consistency with previous doctrine does not seem to have been 
decisive for the Justices.  For that matter, neither does the history of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Instead, Chief Justice Warren bases 
his Brown decision on the special importance of education in American 
society, and the harm that segregation by law causes black 
schoolchildren.  Bolling offers the same argument based on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Neither Brown nor Bolling fit well into the tripartite theory.  It is 
hard to say whether education is a question of political, civil, or social 
equality.  That is not surprising, because the very idea of a pervasive 
welfare state that provides basic elements of opportunity for its citizens 
is not on the minds of framers of Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, 
Brown is at the start of creating a new way of organizing concepts of 
citizenship, one that will eventually use concepts like scrutiny rules, 
classifications, and fundamental rights.  Of course, Brown does not tell 
us anything about this theory, because it has not been developed yet. 
Instead, the very paucity of Brown’s arguments, and the massive 
resistance that followed Brown, spur lawyers, judges, and legal scholars 
to come up with novel and sophisticated theories about why Brown was 
correct.63  This sort of theorizing is particularly vital after the Civil 
Rights revolution, which transforms Brown into a hallowed icon.  
Recognizing that Brown is here to stay, both liberals and conservatives 
attempt to claim the mantle of Brown for themselves, and give accounts 
of Brown that are consistent with their constitutional ideals. 
As noted earlier, by the time Brown is decided, the tripartite 
scheme inherited from Reconstruction no longer makes sense.  It no 
longer makes sense because the notion that the State has nothing to do 
with social equality, but merely facilitates a private sphere of interaction 
that produces social status, no longer makes sense.  It was quite obvious 
to the Supreme Court that Jim Crow was hardly a laissez-faire 
operation.  Instead state and local governments inserted themselves into 
the regulation of almost every facet of everyday life, including schools, 
hospitals, cafeterias, recreational facilities, transportation, public 
accommodations, bathrooms, and water fountains, even funeral parlors.  
All of this was done to maintain and signify the superior status of whites 
over blacks.  Far from a byproduct of purely private decisionmaking, 
the maintenance of social inequality was a state-run project.64 
 
 62 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding segregation of the District of Columbia public schools 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 63 The story is told in Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1497-1500 (2004). 
 64 See Bernstein & Somin, supra note 42, at 602-09. 
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Not only were southern states heavily invested in maintaining 
white supremacy, but the understanding of what governments did and 
could do had also changed, both in the North and the South.  Quite apart 
from white supremacy, all forms of social equality were affected by 
what governments did.  The notion that government was not responsible 
for the inequality produced by private decisionmaking made 
considerably less sense following the New Deal, when the government 
had pledged to take care of its citizens through affirmative programs in 
return for a grant of increased regulatory power. Warren makes this 
point succinctly in Brown itself: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of 
the importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required 
in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship.  Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child 
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.  In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  Such 
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.65 
Education, which is a good delivered by the state, is now essential 
for citizenship.  Good citizenship requires more than the mere 
facilitation of private exchange: it demands that the state provide (or 
subsidize the production of) important public goods.  Education 
symbolizes this function of government, that of collecting taxes and 
redistributing benefits to the citizenry through providing valuable 
services.  In just a few words Warren offers a new vision of citizenship 
grounded in the welfare state and a justification of the welfare state as 
central to good citizenship.66 
In some ways it is appropriate that the language of scrutiny makes 
no appearance in Brown, and that Warren’s most succinct discussion is 
about government’s role in providing education necessary for equal 
citizenship.  That is because Brown is not just a case about racial 
classifications.  It is also a case about systemic oppression of one group 
by another in American society and a case about the distribution of an 
important public good necessary to citizenship. 
So Brown might have three different interpretations.  First, it might 
stand for a principle forbidding government to make classifications 
 
 65 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 66 See ACKERMAN, supra note 52, at 149 (arguing that in Warren’s Brown opinion, the public 
school “‘serves as a compelling symbol of the modern republic’s activist commitment to the 
general welfare.’”) (citations omitted). 
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based on race.  Second, it might stand for a principle forbidding 
government from subordinating one social group to another.  Third, it 
might stand for the principle of fair distribution of the public goods that 
are necessary to citizenship in an increasingly complicated world.  Call 
the first the anticlassification principle, the second the antisubordination 
principle, and the third the fair distribution of public goods principle. 
In the fifty years following Brown, all three themes appear in 
interpretations of the case, and, to some extent, in the constitutional 
doctrine itself; but the anticlassification theme becomes the dominant 
one.  The reason is not internal to the logic of Warren’s opinion, but 
rather to the political and legal struggles that followed it.  Remember 
my earlier point: principles are compromises—they reflect the vector 
sum of the powerful (and less powerful) forces in society.  The 
anticlassification principle proved far more palatable to the white 
majority than the antisubordination principle or the welfare state 
principle.  First, the anticlassification principle appears to offer a simple 
rule of neutrality.  It does not require any inquiry into whether particular 
groups in society are subordinated, or, if so, how bad the subordination 
has been.  It blames no one in particular, but simply asserts that 
henceforth governments will not make racial distinctions.  Second, the 
anticlassification principle, because it is stated in neutral terms, is 
symmetrical, and thus might be used to benefit whites as well as blacks.  
It could become, and did become, a moral and legal argument against 
forms of race conscious affirmative action that disadvantage members 
of the white majority and require the transfer of resources and 
opportunities from whites to blacks.  In like fashion, the 
anticlassification theme was more palatable to the white majority than 
the welfare state principle.  First, it requires almost no distribution from 
those with more resources to the poor, a group strongly identified in the 
public mind with racial minorities, other than to require that resources 
not be allocated directly on the basis of race.  Second, it requires much 
less detailed judicial supervision of public resources and the way that 
the public spends its money.  The anticlassification principle does not, 
at least on its face, challenge the methods that states and municipalities 
use to fund their programs or the ways in which state and local 
governments distribute the benefits of their welfare state activities 
among various groups in society. 
In sum, because the anticlassification interpretation of Brown 
becomes dominant, courts and legislatures do not have to pay so much 
attention to social structure and forms of stratification on the one hand, 
and the duty to provide fair distribution and basic public goods in order 
to guarantee equal citizenship on the other.  Understanding Brown as a 
case about forbidden classifications is the sort of interpretation that 
white majorities can most easily live with. 
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Because this interpretation of Brown is less threatening or 
destabilizing than other possible interpretations, it becomes part of a 
construction of new constitutional doctrines that reshape the contours of 
citizenship and that, in turn, construct a new way of justifying and 
rationalizing various social inequalities.  In this sense, the theory of 
scrutiny rules that emerges following Brown has something in common 
with the tripartite theory that it replaced.  The tripartite theory 
eliminated an earlier legal regime of inequality—chattel slavery—and 
helped justify new forms of social hierarchy and stratification that 
emerged out of the crucible of the Civil War.  The tripartite theory 
justified and rationalized certain forms of social inequality by 
distinguishing between different elements of equality, and by rejecting 
social equality as a goal of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The method of 
scrutiny rules that emerges after Brown helped abolish an earlier form 
of social hierarchy—Jim Crow—and helped justify new forms of social 
hierarchy and stratification that emerged out of the civil rights 
revolution.  It justified and rationalized new forms of social inequality 
by constructing doctrines and interpreting precedents like Brown in 
ways that hindered serious engagement with forms of social hierarchy 
and social structure that emerged from the 1960s.67  It too, helped 
preserve a remainder of social inequality.  
 
ACT III     GRUTTER AND THE END OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 
A.     Implementing Rules 
 
The model of scrutiny rules arises from political forces extending 
over several decades, including social movements on both the left and 
the right, the civil rights movement and the reaction to that movement 
that begins with the 1968 election and the realignment of political 
parties that followed.  The model of scrutiny rules declares 
unconstitutional a set of  delegitimated state practices of race 
discrimination, but it does not abolish all forms of racial inequality or 
social stratification.  Rather, the model of scrutiny rules is developed 
alongside the new forms of racial and social stratification produced in 
the post-civil rights era. 
In the years between Brown v. Board of Education and Grutter v. 
Bollinger, courts construct a new doctrinal framework for articulating 
claims about equal citizenship.  People fight over this framework as it is 
being constructed, so that what emerges is by no means inevitable.  
What ultimately results is a series of doctrines and principles that enacts 
 
 67 See infra text accompanying notes 73-86. 
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a constitutional compromise, reflecting the vector sum of the political 
forces at play.  This compromise, articulated in constitutional doctrine, 
secures a limited vision of equality while making the law of equality 
palatable to the white majority in the United States 
Loving v. Virginia,68 which struck down Virginia’s prohibition on 
interracial marriage, is an important moment in construction of the new 
doctrinal regime.  Interracial marriage was a central symbol of social 
equality, an equality not guaranteed by the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  By holding that Virginia could not prevent whites and 
blacks from becoming members of the same family through marriage, 
the Court jettisoned the last elements of the tripartite scheme, seemingly 
abolishing all distinctions between civil, political, and social equality 
and substituting a new conception of racial equality. 
Loving contains both anticlassification and antisubordination 
language.69  Today, however, the case is mostly cited for two 
propositions: first, that racial classifications are suspect and subject to 
strict scrutiny, and second, that the Constitution protects a fundamental 
right to marry.70  Thus, all of the key elements of the new model of 
constitutional citizenship appear in Loving: the recognition of suspect 
classifications and fundamental rights, and the application of strict 
scrutiny. 
The model of scrutiny rules could have taken any number of 
different directions.  By 1967, when the Supreme Court decides Loving, 
it is already experimenting with constitutional protections within the 
welfare state to protect the poor, altering the boundaries between public 
and private discrimination through the doctrines of state action, 
expanding criminal procedure protections and invigorating 
constitutional guarantees for freedom of speech. There is no reason 
internal to the model itself why the model of scrutiny rules might not 
have developed in a much more progressive direction than it actually 
did.  Instead, political forces produced by and reacting to the Second 
Reconstruction led to political decisions and judicial appointments that 
interpreted and implemented the model in more conservative ways. 
Therefore, we must distinguish the particular substantive results that a 
model of citizenship produces from its characteristic forms of 
reasoning.  In hindsight it may appear that the former necessarily 
flowed from the latter, but that is because certain people gained power 
and certain paths were not taken. 
 
 68 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 69 Id. at 11 (“[R]acial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, [must] be 
subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ . . . the racial classifications must stand on their own 
justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 9, 12 (2003). 
 70 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. 
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It is instructive to compare the model of scrutiny rules with the 
history of the tripartite model.  Following the collapse of slavery, 
southern states attempted to reinstitute chattel slavery by another name 
through the Black Codes.  The Fourteenth Amendment outlawed this 
practice and promised equal citizenship.  The most radical members of 
the Republican Party wanted to do far more, but eventually settled for 
the compromise of the tripartite scheme.  That compromise was further 
compromised with the end of Reconstruction, the withdrawal of federal 
troops following the Compromise of 1876, and the gradual acceptance 
of increasing white dominance over black populations in the South 
leading to the Civil Rights Cases,71 Plessy v. Ferguson, and black 
disenfranchisement72 in the decades that followed. 
Decades later, the Cold War and the civil rights movement led 
Congress and the courts to dismantle the system of de jure segregation 
that emerged after Plessy.  Some wanted to do far more than this, but 
eventually political reaction to the civil rights movement and the 
upheavals of the 1960s led to a series of political compromises in the 
1970s and 1980s as the Second Reconstruction came to an end—the 
very period in which the contours of the model of scrutiny rules were 
fixed and the details filled in.73  These compromises produced the model 
as we know it today, but they were not the only possible instantiation.  
The model of scrutiny rules had far more degrees of freedom than the 
tripartite theory.  The tripartite theory was launched with a 
constitutional amendment that, to a very large degree, embodied the 
idea of civil equality in its text.  The model of scrutiny rules, by 
contrast, had no clear starting point.  It developed over time, its 
compromises were worked out over many decades, and its concepts 
were repeatedly adapted to new situations and new political forces. 
The model of scrutiny rules has four key features: First, there are 
suspect (and later quasi-suspect) classifications which are presumptively 
forbidden to the government.  Second, there are fundamental rights with 
which the government is presumptively forbidden to interfere.  Third, 
forbidden classifications and abridgements of fundamental rights both 
receive heightened (and usually strict) scrutiny, which makes them 
presumptively unconstitutional, although that presumption may not be 
fatal in a small number of cases.  Fourth, any challenged government 
action that does not involve a suspect classification or an abridgment of 
a fundamental right is subject to the test of rational basis, which means 
that it is presumptively constitutional.  In other words, government 
action that falls outside the realm of suspect classification or abridgment 
 
 71 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 72 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (refusing to intervene in Alabama’s system of black 
voter disenfranchisement). 
 73 Balkin & Siegel, supra note 69, at 29. 
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of fundamental rights is assumed to be the democratically fair outcome 
of struggles within the political process.  Courts must respect the 
outcome of such struggles, even if they reinforce or maintain social 
stratification, because respecting the work of the political process is 
respect for democracy itself. 
The political compromises in this system of constitutional 
citizenship arise in deciding what classifications are suspect and what 
rights are fundamental, and, conversely, what sorts of political decisions 
are immunized from judicial scrutiny and are relegated to the realm of 
everyday political struggle.  Courts have articulated these compromises 
in many different ways. 
For example, although race and sex classifications are inherently 
suspect, courts can declare that certain government practices are not 
classifications on the basis of race or sex.  Examples include pregnancy 
discrimination, which the Supreme Court has held is not sex 
discrimination, and racial suspect descriptions,74 which some courts 
have held are not classifications on the basis of race.75  In school 
desegregation litigation, the distinction between de jure and de facto 
discrimination insulates certain forms of school segregation from 
judicial remedy because they cannot be traced to forbidden 
governmental classifications on the basis of race.  The Supreme Court’s 
1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley76 absolves wealthier and mostly 
white suburban school districts from having to share resources with 
poorer and mostly minority inner city school districts.  What constitutes 
classification on the basis of race or sex can change over time as old 
practices once thought legitimate are later delegitimated through social 
movement activism and political protest. 
Courts can also create rules of proof and burden shifting.  For 
example, in McCleskey v. Kemp,77 the Supreme Court held that 
statistical proof that defendants who murdered white victims were far 
more likely to receive the death penalty than those who murdered black 
victims did not demonstrate invidious discrimination on the part of 
juries or prosecutors.  In Washington v. Davis78 and Personnel 
Administrator v. Feeney,79 the Supreme Court held that government 
policies that have a predictably disparate impact that disadvantages 
women and minorities are constitutional unless one can prove that the 
government decisionmaker intended to harm the group in question. 
Thus, even if government practices help maintain racial stratification or 
 
 74 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 75 Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 235 F.3d 769 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
 76 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (imposing strict limits on interdistrict desegregation plans). 
 77 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 78 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 79 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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the lower social status of women, these practices are insulated from 
constitutional attack unless one can prove they were deliberately put in 
place to harm women or racial minorities.  In addition, practices that 
maintain or reinforce economic stratification are also insulated from 
equal protection scrutiny because poverty is not a suspect classification, 
and government practices that distribute educational opportunities 
unequally, and thus help maintain social stratification, are insulated 
from constitutional scrutiny because education is not a fundamental 
right.  At the same time, if governments attempt to use race conscious 
affirmative action to dismantle racial stratification, their actions are 
presumptively unconstitutional because they are subject to strict 
scrutiny.80 
Similar compromises occur in the area of fundamental rights. 
Following the 1968 election, the Supreme Court also closed the door on 
the use of fundamental rights doctrine to constitutionalize the welfare 
state.81  The New Deal revolution established that the government’s 
welfare state activities are in most cases constitutionally permissible, 
but the government is under no obligation to employ its welfare state 
power to secure equal opportunity or even minimum amounts of 
government services that might be necessary for minimum levels of 
opportunity.82  Abortion law is another good example of how political 
compromises shape the implementation of guarantees of fundamental 
rights.  Although the Supreme Court currently guarantees the formal 
right to abortion, it allows states to disfavor abortion and impose 
regulations that predictably discourage it.83  States may refuse to fund 
abortions for poor women and may prohibit state facilities from 
performing abortions, even if this makes abortions practically 
impossible to get in certain parts of the country.84 
 
 80 See Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 5, at 1141-42. 
 81 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (declining to extend right to counsel to indigents 
seeking discretionary review in the state Supreme Court); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1973) (reaffirming the rule of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471 (1970), that poverty is not a suspect classification); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449-
50 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause did not require waiver of a fifty dollar filing fee 
in bankruptcy cases); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (rejecting claim that the 
“need for decent shelter” rose to the level of a fundamental interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-24 (1971) (holding that a state did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment when it conditioned continuation of welfare benefits on unannounced 
“home visits” by welfare case workers, because the visitations were “not forced or compelled”); 
cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-49 (1976) (holding that a recipient of disability 
benefits under the Social Security Act was not entitled to a hearing prior to termination, and 
announcing a balancing test for procedural due process cases). 
 82 See cases cited supra note 81. 
 83 Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
 84 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
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In short, the model of scrutiny rules requires not only a set of 
decisions about what constitutes a suspect classification or a 
fundamental right, but also a series of implementing rules that 
determine when a suspect classification has occurred or fundamental 
right has been abridged.85  Many different implementing rules are 
possible within the model, and these implementing rules are where most 
of the work of political compromise occurs, legitimating some practices 
that contribute to social stratification and delegitimating others.86 
Not surprisingly, then, our contemporary model of constitutional 
citizenship, like the tripartite model it replaced, legalizes and supports 
certain forms of social stratification, including stratification by race and 
sex.  To the extent that the tripartite model recognized the existence of 
social stratification, it assumed that some social stratification was 
inevitable because blacks and whites were not and could not be social 
equals.  Likewise, the modern system also views some social 
inequality—to the extent that it recognizes it—as the inevitable if 
occasionally unfortunate outcome of markets, individual private 
preferences, and judicial respect for legislation passed by 
democratically elected representatives of the people. 
The tripartite system abolished an earlier form of racial 
stratification—chattel slavery—while simultaneously helping legitimate 
new forms of racial stratification through the distinction between civil 
and social equality, and through turning a blind eye to denials of 
political equality that become more frequent in the years following 
Plessy.  In like fashion, the system of scrutiny rules outlawed an earlier 
form of racial stratification—de jure segregation—that had been 
delegitimated in American politics.  At the same time, the system of 
scrutiny rules legitimated new forms of racial and social stratification 
that developed and evolved even as the old forms were receding into 
history.  Battles over constitutional rights produced compromises in 
legal rules and in constitutional doctrine that determined which 
developing practices of social stratification would be recognized and 
prohibited by the model of constitutional citizenship and which 
practices would either not be recognized as existing or would be 
immunized and legitimated. 
The key ideas of suspect classification, fundamental rights and 
heightened judicial scrutiny—and their associated implementation 
rules—produce our contemporary version of what the triparite theory 
referred to as equality before the law.  These ideas serve as our era’s  
gatekeepers for recognizing (or failing to recognize) problems of 
equality, and for determining what is a problem of constitutional 
equality in the eyes of the law and what is not.  Through these doctrines 
 
 85 Balkin & Siegel, supra note 69, at 13-24. 
 86 Id. at 24-28. 
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judges and lawyers have created our age’s own liminal theory of 
equality, a theory of equality that majorities can live with. 
 
B.     Grutter v. Bollinger 
 
Like Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharpe, Grutter 
v. Bollinger is doctrinally awkward.  While Brown does not offer a well 
worked-out theory of constitutional citizenship, Grutter does not fit 
easily into a well developed edifice of equality law that mostly 
conservative courts had created over the course of three decades.  
Instead, as I shall explain in a moment, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Grutter tends to paper over rather serious doctrinal difficulties.  There 
are two ways of understanding this phenomenon.  First, Grutter might 
simply be a mid-course correction—it reflects an ongoing political 
compromise over affirmative action in education that has gotten worked 
out in constitutional decisionmaking, however doctrinally ungainly it 
may appear to skeptics.  The Supreme Court tends to follow national 
majorities in the long run, whether or not this produces decisions that 
will appeal to the purist.  The second possibility is that Grutter’s 
doctrinal awkwardness signals that the model of scrutiny rules has 
become increasingly unwieldy, and it is in the process of breaking 
down, to be replaced in succeeding decades by a new and as yet 
undetermined model of constitutional citizenship.  My guess is that both 
explanations have a grain of truth in them. 
Plessy, Brown, and Grutter all reflect two basic facts about 
Supreme Court decisionmaking.  The first is that Supreme Court 
decisions tend to match the views of national majorities—and 
particularly the views of national elites.  The second is that the Supreme 
Court tends to protect minorities just about as much as majorities want 
them to.87  Plessy adopted the scientific racism of northern elites, while 
Brown reflected the foreign policy imperatives of the Cold War.88  
Grutter reflects support for educational affirmative action by a wide 
number of elite institutions in business, the military, and the academy 
itself.  It is surely no accident that Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion 
prominently cites amicus briefs from military officers and from various 
Fortune 500 companies who argued that “the skills needed in today’s 
 
 87 For more discussion of these two lessons about Supreme Court decisionmaking, see Jack 
M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1538-46, 
1550-57 (2004). 
 88 KLARMAN, supra note 42, at 22-23 (noting that Plessy was largely consistent with 
Northern white opinion, or at least did not greatly offend Northern sensibilities, and that the 
decision produced little comment in the Northern press); MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL 
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 80-81 (2000) (tracing the history of 
the Cold War imperative for black civil rights and desegregation). 
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increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through 
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints” and 
that “a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to 
the military’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national 
security.’”89  When large corporations inform the Court that affirmative 
action is necessary for competitiveness in global capitalism, and when 
members of the military insist that affirmative action is necessary for 
national security, it is clear that race conscious affirmative action in 
education is no radical nostrum of the left but is thoroughly and utterly 
mainstream. 
In Grutter, as in Brown, the Court emphasizes the link between 
citizenship and education.  Indeed, it quotes Brown for the proposition 
that “education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship.”90  But it 
makes this connection in two different ways.  First, the Court argues 
that affirmative action is necessary for individuals to secure equal 
opportunity: “the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through 
public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all 
individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”91  This opportunity, the 
Court argues, is necessary for national unity: “Effective participation by 
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is 
essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”92 
O’Connor’s rhetoric is partly in tension with the Court’s previous 
insistence that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, not 
groups.93  Although she  asserts that race conscious affirmative action is 
consistent with, and perhaps even required by, respect for individuals 
and individual opportunity, the Court had previously argued that racial 
classifications, by their very nature, are group based categorizations that 
deny the dignity of individuals.94 
O’Connor’s second claim about education and citizenship makes 
the tension with the Court’s previous decisions even more explicit.  
Diversity in education, O’Connor, explains, is necessary because it 
 
 89 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (quoting Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae 
at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Brief for General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae 
at 3-4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici 
Curiae at 27, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). 
 90 Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 332. 
 93 Id. at 326 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘protect[s] persons, not groups.’”) (quoting 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
 94 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[A]ll governmental action based on race—a group 
classification long recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited,’ . . . 
should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal 
protection of the laws has not been infringed.”); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (“To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ 
to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole 
criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking.”). 
 
132 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:5 
helps secure legitimacy: “In order to cultivate a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to 
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity.” “All members of our heterogeneous society,” 
O’Connor asserts, “must have confidence in the openness and integrity 
of the educational institutions that provide this training.”95  In other 
words, if elite educational institutions are not producing their fair share 
of future leaders, people will lose confidence in the fairness of the 
educational system. 
Thus, “[a]ccess to legal education (and thus the legal profession) 
must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may 
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and 
education necessary to succeed in America.”96  Legitimacy comes from 
the appearance (if not the reality) that positions of leadership are open 
to different groups in society.  That means that key demographic 
groups—including blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans—must have a 
share of opportunities in elite institutions so that these institutions, in 
turn, can produce members of these groups who share in the future 
leadership of the country.  But this argument about leadership is not 
about protecting individual rights; it is about distributing opportunities 
among various social groups.  The Court’s theory, outlined in earlier 
cases, that equal protection has nothing to do with securing equal 
representation for groups and everything to do with protecting 
individuals from being viewed as members of groups, has been strained 
to the breaking point. 
O’Connor’s argument in Grutter makes legitimacy a key 
justification for diversity.  This legitimacy is of two types.  One is 
sociological legitimacy—whether people believe that the system is 
sufficiently fair and just that they can support it.  The other form of 
legitimacy is moral legitimacy: whether the system actually is fair and 
just.  O’Connor does not tell us which kind of legitimacy she means; 
although she emphasizes that opportunities for leadership must be 
“visibly open,” which suggests that her concern is sociological 
legitimacy, she may mean far more than merely keeping up 
appearances.  What is important for our purposes is that what other 
people think about the justice of the American educational system 
clearly matters for the Court, just as what other nations thought about 
Jim Crow during the Cold War was an important factor in the Court’s 
decision in Brown.  Foreign policy elites viewed America’s treatment of 
African-Americans as an embarrassment that should be ended.  The 
decision in Brown helped remedy a deficit in the country’s legitimacy.  
 
 95 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332. 
 96 Id. at 332-33. 
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In 2003, establishment elites argued that American legitimacy, both 
domestically and around the world, required the appearance, if not the 
reality, that positions of leadership were open to everyone in society, 
regardless of race or ethnicity.  And so the Court responds by allowing 
educational institutions to engage in race-conscious affirmative action, 
for fear that without it, few black, Latino, or Native American faces 
would appear in the classrooms of elite institutions.97 
Yet in order to achieve its desired result, the Court has to cut back 
on the implementing rules and doctrinal requirements it created in cases 
like Bakke,98 Wygant,99 Croson,100 and Adarand.101  Together these 
decisions created a matrix of rules that strongly discouraged race-
conscious affirmative action and made it difficult for these programs to 
survive judicial scrutiny.  By greatly restricting the ways that majorities 
could remedy past discrimination, these decisions helped rationalize an 
evolving system of social stratification that developed alongside the 
model of scrutiny rules. 
The matrix of implementation rules created during the 1970s and 
1980s have had four major elements: First, classifications based on race 
are subject to strict scrutiny whether they are “benign” race conscious 
affirmative action or invidious discrimination against racial 
minorities.102  All such classifications must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest and there must be no 
racially neutral alternatives.103  Second, remedying the effects of past 
societal discrimination, providing distributive justice among various 
disadvantaged groups in the present,104 and providing role models for 
disadvantaged groups105 are not compelling state interests that can 
 
 97 In dissent, Justice Thomas argues that racial preferences are merely “aesthetic” and that if 
Michigan wants them it can simply change its admissions policy and cease to be an elite 
institution.  Id. at 355 n.3, 356-62 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  This is merely the flip side of 
O’Connor’s argument about legitimacy.  In order for the American system of education to have 
legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, it is important that Michigan continue to be an elite 
institution that prepares future leaders and that it be visibly open to blacks and Latinos.  For if it 
ceased to be the sort of elite institution that opened doors to future leadership positions because it 
wanted to admit more blacks and Latinos, it would contribute far less to the appearance as well as 
the reality of legitimacy. 
 98 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 99 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986). 
 100 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 101 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 102 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-80; id. at 285-86 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298-99. 
 103 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274, Bakke; 
438 U.S. at 299. 
 104 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306-07. 
 105 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275-76.  Nevertheless, the governmental unit “can use its spending 
powers to remedy private discrimination” that results from its procurement policies, “if it 
identifies that discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (announcing “passive participant” rule). 
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justify race-conscious affirmative action.  Third, remedying previous 
discrimination by the specific governmental unit that seeks to engage in 
race-conscious affirmative action is a compelling state interest but there 
must be significant proof of past discrimination by the governmental 
unit that seeks to implement an affirmative action program.106  Fourth, 
achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state interest that can 
justify race conscious-affirmative action.107 
These precedents had “discourse shaping” or “discourse forcing” 
effects.  If state governments wanted to practice race-conscious 
affirmative action, they had to speak in certain ways.  They could not 
say that they were remedying past societal discrimination against 
minorities, nor could they say that they were remedying their own past 
discrimination unless they had proof that they had discriminated against 
each and every minority they wished to assist.  That meant, for example, 
that the University of Michigan would have had to demonstrate that it 
had discriminated against Latinos or Native Americans if it wished to 
provide either a preference in its affirmative action policy.  Thus, the 
rules in place forced university administrators to speak the language of 
diversity.108  Hence, they packed all of their different aims into the 
language of educational diversity, and as a result, the word “diversity” 
came to conflate several different ideas. 
There are at least four different types of diversity.  Ideological 
diversity seeks to ensure a mix of students with different beliefs 
(including but not limited to beliefs about politics and religion). 
Experiential diversity seeks to ensure a mix of students who have had 
different backgrounds and experiences (applicants who are poor or rich, 
have gone parachuting, have worked in relief agencies in the Third 
World, are former soldiers, battled childhood traumas or diseases, and 
so on).  Diversity of talents seeks to ensure a mix of students with 
different talents and abilities (athletes, cello players, actors, and so on).  
Finally, demographic diversity seeks to ensure a mix of students from 
different ethnic, social and religious groups. 
These forms of diversity may often overlap, but they may also 
point in quite different directions.  For example, admitting a 
conservative pro-life white male who plays the flute may add to 
ideological diversity and diversity of talents, but it may not necessarily 
promote demographic diversity.  Admitting an additional African-
American student may promote demographic or experiential diversity, 
but it may not promote either demographic or experiential diversity as 
much as adding a student from Malaysia or Kazakhstan. 
 
 106 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76. 
 107 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15. 
 108 See Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 578 (2000). 
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Michigan’s critical mass policy clearly makes the most sense if the 
goal is demographic or experiential diversity, far less sense if the goal is 
ideological diversity, and it is orthogonal to the goal of securing a 
diversity of talents.  Justice Powell’s original conception of diversity in 
Bakke deliberately conflated all of these forms of diversity.  He based 
his argument on universities’ academic freedom, arguing that 
“universities must be accorded the right to select those students who 
will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas,’”109 an 
argument that sounds in ideological diversity.  But Powell also argued 
that “the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of 
many peoples.”110  This seems to be about experiential diversity.  
“Ethnic diversity,” by which Powell presumably meant demographic 
diversity, contributed to these goals, as long as it “is only one element in 
a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the 
goal of a heterogeneous student body.”111  In this way, Powell allowed 
universities to admit members of previously disadvantaged groups 
without having to state directly that they were remedying past societal 
discrimination or attempting to “reduc[e] the historic deficit of 
traditionally disfavored minorities” in colleges and university 
programs,112 which Powell himself characterized as an unlawful interest 
in racial balancing.113  Although Powell insisted that remedying societal 
discrimination and achieving distributive justice among disadvantaged 
groups were not legitimate purposes for affirmative action, his mangling 
of the different concepts of diversity allowed these goals to be pursued 
surreptitiously. 
Justice O’Connor continued and extended Powell’s conflation of 
the different types of diversity in Grutter.  In this way, she undermined 
the logic of previous decisions like Wygant, Croson, and Adarand.  
These decisions had created implementing rules that sought to prevent 
governments from using race conscious affirmative action to remedy 
past societal discrimination or to redistribute opportunities or resources 
between whites and disadvantaged minority groups. 
Grutter undermined two other features of the Court’s 
implementing rules—that “the standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or 
benefited by a particular classification,”114 and that all racial 
 
 109 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. 
 110 Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 111 Id. at 314. 
 112 Id. at 306. 
 113 Id. at 307; accord, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322-25, 328-31 (2003). 
 114 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion)).  O’Connor calls this the principle of 
“consistency.” 
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classifications, whether characterized as benign or invidious, are subject 
to strict scrutiny.115 
In Grutter, Justice O’Connor defers to “[t]he Law School’s 
educational judgment that . . . diversity is essential to its educational 
mission” because of “complex educational judgments in an area that lies 
primarily within the expertise of the university.”116  “‘[G]ood faith’ on 
the part of a university,” she explains, “is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing 
to the contrary.’”117 
The fact that the Court engages in this sort of deference is a tell-
tale sign that it is not applying a scrutiny as strict as it claims.  When 
courts apply strict scrutiny, they do not usually defer to the judgments 
of government decisionmakers, especially when the government 
decisionmakers have deliberately made racial classifications.  It is 
difficult to believe that the Court would give Michigan the same degree 
of deference if the university announced that educational considerations 
made it necessary to increase enrollments of white students.  The most 
likely reason why the Court gives university officials the benefit of the 
doubt is that it believes that Michigan’s decisionmaking process is 
designed to be benign rather than invidious.  It applies a different degree 
of scrutiny to policies admittedly designed to assist minorities than to 
policies deliberately designed to subordinate them.  Both of these 
positions, of course, are inconsistent with the Court’s opinions in 
Adarand and Croson, not to mention language in the Grutter opinion 
itself.118 
Finally, Grutter undermines the other requirement of strict 
scrutiny: that racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to achieve 
their ends.  Michigan argued that it needed a “critical mass” of 
minorities to achieve its goal of diversity.  The critical mass was 
necessary to ensure that minority students “do not feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race.”119  A critical mass also undermines 
“racial stereotypes . . . because nonminority students learn there is no 
‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority 
students.”120  But the theory behind the critical mass does not explain 
 
 115 Id. at 227.  O’Connor calls this the principle of “skepticism.”  Id. at 223. 
 116 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 117 Id. at 330 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19). 
 118 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, Croson, 488 U.S. at 494, Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-280; id. at 
285-86 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 119 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. 
 120 Id. at 320. 
[T]he Law School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps to 
break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better understand persons of 
different races.” These benefits are “important and laudable,” because “classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” 
when the students have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.” 
Id. at 333 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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why Michigan consistently chose different percentages of blacks, 
Latinos, and Native Americans for its entering class.  Between 1995 and 
2000, for example, the number of African Americans admitted was 
more than five times the number of Native Americans, and almost twice 
the number of Latinos.121  If the point of the critical mass policy is to 
keep students from feeling isolated or feeling like they must be 
spokespersons for their group, it is not clear why it takes five times as 
many black admittees for black students to feel comfortable about 
themselves than it does for Native American students to feel 
comfortable about themselves, or why it takes twice as many black 
admittees to rebut the assumption that all blacks think in lockstep than it 
does to rebut similar stereotypes about Latinos.122 
However, if Michigan’s goal were to give major demographic 
groups in American society a fair share of opportunities at elite 
institutions, the Law School’s admissions decisions would make some 
sense.  Michigan might wish to ensure that blacks, Latinos, and Native 
Americans were represented in the entering class in rough proportion to 
the number of applications received.  On the other hand, because Asian 
Americans will likely be fairly well-represented in the entering class, 
there is no need to give them any admissions preference.  But if so, then 
it seems likely that Michigan’s program is designed to achieve goals of 
distributive justice and to help dismantle the effects of previous societal 
discrimination and existing racial stratification.  That is to say, 
Michigan’s purposes are consistent with the antisubordination principle, 
but not with the matrix of implementing rules that the Court devised in 
Wygant, Croson, and Adarand to restrict the purposes and scope of 
affirmative action.  By artfully conflating different meanings of the 
concept of diversity, and by diplomatically overlooking the relationship 
between the theory of critical mass and Michigan’s actual admission 
practices, O’Connor papers over the cracks in the edifice she and her 
fellow Justices had constructed over the course of three decades.123 
 
 121 Id. at 384 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 122 Id. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 123 Sanford Levinson has pointed out to me that Justice O’Connor’s famous remark that “[w]e 
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further 
the interest [in diversity] approved today,” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342, also shows the incoherence 
of her argument and of her use of the concept of diversity.  The twenty-five year remark 
undermines the claim that the compelling interest in Grutter is merely ideological or experiential 
diversity and implies that the real purpose of affirmative action is promoting distributive justice 
among groups and other antisubordination concerns.  If the point of educational affirmative action 
is achieving, year after year, a healthy mixture of individuals with different experiences and ideas, 
a university will always have to be attentive to the mix of students who apply.  Thus the need to 
assure a critical mass of minorities who will help provide an appropriate mix of diverse 
experiences, beliefs, and perspectives should, in principle, be never ending.  On the other hand, if 
the point of educational affirmative action is to dismantle previous forms of social stratification 
and place social groups on a more or less level playing field in the future, it makes more sense to 
think that at some point admission preferences should cease.  One might reasonably believe that 
 
138 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:5 
In order reach the result the majority wishes to reach, it must 
stretch existing doctrinal categories.  It must work around doctrinal 
structures that were put in place partly to hinder race conscious attempts 
at remedying racial stratification. 
There are at least four different ways of looking at O’Connor’s 
accomplishment in Grutter. The first is that her opinion is simply 
intellectually dishonest.  The second is that it is an act of supreme 
statesmanship, in which O’Connor balances what appeared to be 
irreconcilable conceptions of equality and produces a political 
compromise that most of the public can live with.  The third is that the 
compromise is hardly remarkable or statesmanlike; it reflects the 
Supreme Court’s continuous adjustment of its doctrines to the imagined 
center of public opinion.  Grutter is nothing more than a quotidian 
accommodation of slightly altered political realties within the model of 
scrutiny rules, a model which remains essentially intact.  The fourth 
possibility, however, is that the awkwardness of Grutter’s doctrinal 
compromise reflects something far larger: it suggests that the system of 
implementing rules that supported the model of scrutiny rules has been 
stretched to the breaking point, and that the model has outlived its 
usefulness. 
To reach the result it wants, the Court obfuscates and fudges 
existing doctrinal categories.  It holds that state universities may make 
individualized determinations that take race into account in admissions, 
if race is only one factor and if the university is willing to pay for the 
extra cost of individualized determinations.  Of course, these 
individualized determinations are precisely the sort that also tend to 
hide the decisionmaking process from view and obscure the role that 
race plays in the decisionmaking process.  To achieve this result the 
Court must wriggle around the implementing rules—symmetry, strict 
scrutiny, and stringent proof requirements—whose primary purpose was 
to rationalize a particular legal social system of equality and inequality 
that arose with the Second Reconstruction. 
Grutter suggests that the present system of constitutional 
citizenship, which rationalizes equal citizenship through scrutiny rules, 
has become increasingly complicated and unwieldy.  Grutter, to be sure, 
is only one case.  However, there is some additional evidence that the 
system’s seams are starting to unravel, as the Court moves toward fairly 
ad hoc balancing in a number of different areas.124  Not only has strict 
scrutiny become less than strict in Grutter, but the rational basis test has 
 
at some point these preferences, plus social mobility and inevitable social change, will have 
mitigated the most important sources of social inequality among groups. 
 124 I do not claim that this is a particularly new phenomenon.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987) (arguing that 
balancing has become “widespread, if not dominant, over the last four decades”). 
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become stricter to protect groups like the mentally retarded,125 the 
children of illegal immigrants,126 and homosexuals.127  The Court 
introduced a medium level of scrutiny in its sex equality cases in the 
1970s,128 and then began applying it in novel ways in the First 
Amendment area in the 1990s.129  In Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,130 a key fundamental rights 
decision, the Court simply replaced the strict scrutiny standard of earlier 
cases with the more amorphous test of “undue burden.”131  In its recent 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas,132 which held that same-sex sodomy 
laws violated the right of privacy, Justice Kennedy’s opinion refused to 
state directly that the Court was protecting a fundamental right subject 
to strict scrutiny, preferring instead to speak of the “liberty” protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.133 
External causes may be an important reason why the doctrinal 
structure is coming apart.  Three factors in particular are worth 
mentioning.  First, the Supreme Court has been grappling with different 
kinds of issues and facing claims from different kinds of social 
movements than it did in the 1950s and 1960s.  Abortion, 
homosexuality, and structural media regulation may present problems 
that are not easily addressed through doctrinal models designed to 
protect political dissent and racial equality.  Second, if we are indeed on 
the cusp of significant social change—for example, in the recognition of 
rights for homosexuals—we might be in a period of transition like the 
years before and after Brown,134 in which the doctrine is fairly ad hoc 
and does not make too much sense.135  It is important to remember that 
the full articulation of the model of scrutiny rules came only after much 
of the work of the Second Reconstruction was already accomplished.  
Indeed, the doctrinal structure created in the 1970s and 1980s served as 
much to cabin and limit the Second Reconstruction as to vindicate it.  
Third, and perhaps most intriguing, because we live in an era of 
globalization, the next several decades promise a wide variety of 
constitutional questions about the rights of immigrants and non-citizens.  
 
 125 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 126 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 127 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 128 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 129 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997); Turner Broadcasting 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny to “must carry” 
provisions of Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 on the grounds 
that they were content neutral). 
 130 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 131 Id. at 874-76. 
 132 539 U.S. 538 (2003). 
 133 Id. at 562, 564, 567-78. 
 134 I am indebted to Reva Siegel for this point. 
 135 I fully realize that I have begged the question whether the Supreme Court’s doctrine ever 
has made very much sense. 
 
140 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:5 
These questions will severely test constitutional doctrines that are based 
on a model of the equal rights of citizens.  The very idea of equal 
constitutional citizenship, the question I have been addressing in this 
essay, may make considerably less sense on Brown’s one hundredth 
anniversary. 
Is the system of scrutiny rules really on its way out?  The tripartite 
theory of citizenship went through significant changes following the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and collapsed within seventy 
years.  It is hard to assess a similar time frame for the model of scrutiny 
rules because it was not inaugurated at a single point in time.  It has 
been roughly seventy years since the New Deal, fifty years since Brown 
v. Board of Education, and forty years since Loving v. Virginia.  Grutter 
could signal the beginning of the end, or it could mean nothing, just a 
blip on the screen.  It is simply too early to tell, and as with many 
momentous transformations, we may be able to tell only some time after 
the change has already taken place.  Of one thing, however, we can be 
sure: the way we conceptualize the basic rights of citizens today will not 




Brown is an icon, a symbol, but what is it a symbol of?  I would 
say that it symbolizes the decay and dissolution of an older way of 
thinking about what it meant to be an equal citizen, equal before the 
law, and the beginning of a new conceptualization of equal citizenship 
that matured in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Like the tripartite theory that it replaced, this new way of 
imagining equality before the law did not in fact make people equal, or 
even equal before the law.  Rather, the new theory of imagining 
citizenship was simultaneously a way of providing new guarantees of 
equality that the older system had not recognized, while preserving 
newly developing forms of economic and social inequality, either by 
claiming that such inequalities were beyond the scope of constitutional 
law, or by not even recognizing them as being instances of economic 
and social stratification. 
Public education provides an excellent example.  As we have seen, 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown spoke urgently and eloquently 
about the importance of equal educational opportunity to equal 
citizenship.  But the new model of citizenship that developed fifty years 
after Brown did not produce anything like equal educational 
opportunity.  True, pupils are no longer deliberately assigned to schools 
on the basis of their race.  De jure segregation in public schools is 
largely a thing of the past.  Yet the United States, has for some time 
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been in a process of resegregation by other means.  Largely white 
suburban and exurban school districts ring central city school districts 
that are predominantly black and Latino.  In many of these central city 
districts public schools provide very little educational opportunity to 
their students, much less opportunities equal to those in the largely 
white suburbs.  We have rid the world of Jim Crow, but in its place we 
have produced a new world of inequality.  And we have created an 
elaborate system of doctrines in order to rationalize and justify it as 
being entirely consistent with everyone being equal before the law.  Not 
to put to fine a point on it, but that is not so different from what the 
tripartite theory achieved one hundred and forty years ago.  It rid the 
world of a great evil—chattel slavery—and promised that, henceforth, 
everyone, regardless of color, would be equal before the law.  But that 
promise, however great an advance on the legal regime that preceded it, 
rang hollow in many ways. 
Both law and the theories of citizenship that law articulates and 
puts into practice are Janus-faced.  They are liminal.  They define the 
guarantees of equal citizenship while defining what is not a question of 
equal citizenship.  To understand this, we must think of the law like a 
bronze statue formed from pouring molten metal into a mold.  Instead of 
studying the surface of the statue, we should study the mold used to cast 
it.  To understand what law does, we should examine what it does not 
do, what law leaves unsaid, unoccupied, unrecognized, and untouched.  
Because the law of equality is also the law of inequality, if we want to 
understand how inequality is reproduced in the United States, we must 
consider how the law of equality assists in this reproduction, just as if 
we want to understand the system of censorship in the United States, we 
must look to what is recognized and unrecognized by the law of 
freedom of speech. 
This is not a denial of progress; it is a description of it.  Progress in 
law comes from replacing one set of liminal categories of thought with 
a new set, which promise finally to deliver real equality but which in 
fact never do.  There is always a remainder. 
Brown represents the moment at which the old forms have cracked 
and new ones are yet to be prepared. Brown is like a child, full of future 
hopes and future possibilities.  Some of those hopes are realized, others 
are dashed.  We watch the law of equality grow, and as it grows, it 
grows compromised.  Then we wonder whether all of the haggard lines 
we now discover in its face were somehow immanent in the rosy cheeks 
of the infant.  But it is not so.  It takes hard intellectual work to create 
doctrines and principles that reflect compromises between competing 
social forces, that dismantle an old regime of inequality and help 
establish a new one, and that produce a simultaneous law of equality 
and inequality that majorities can live with. 
